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Abstract: Luciano Floridi has been very active in helping to develop both the philosophy of information as a discipline and 
an actual theory of the nature of semantic information. This paper has three purposes. First, is to demonstrate that Floridi’s 
information theory was largely prefigured by work carried out by Mingers and published some ten years earlier. This is 
simply a matter of setting the record straight, although the degree of commonality may provide some support for the theory. 
Second, to point out that there appears to be a degree of equivocation, or even contradiction, within Floridi’s theory con-
cerning the ontological status of information – is it objective, independent of the receiver, or is it subjective, constructed by 
the receiver from the data they access? The paper argues strongly for an objective interpretation. Third, to point out exten-
sions to Mingers’ theory in terms of the social and pragmatic aspects of language, the processing of information into mean-
ing through embodied cognition, and the relation between information and different forms of knowledge   
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1. Introduction 
Luciano Floridi has been hugely influential in both establishing, almost single-handedly, the dis-
cipline of information philosophy (Floridi, 1999, 2002b, 2003), and constructing a specific theory of 
semantic information itself (Floridi, 2003, 2004b, 2005, 2009b, 2010a)
1
. In this brief note, I wish to 
discuss the theory of information and, in particular, to draw attention to the fact that much of it was 
actually prefigured by my own theory of information some ten years before (Mingers, 1995, 1996a, 
1996b). It is not at all my intention to suggest that Floridi copied my ideas. Rather, as I believe is 
very common, similar trains of thought and research have occurred relatively independently of each 
other but have arrived at very similar points. If this is indeed the case, then this triangulation adds 
strength to the underlying concepts.   
In the first section, I will outline my theory of information and in the second I will discuss Floridi’s 
theory, showing how similar it is to my own. Then in the third section I will identify what I consider to 
be a basic inconsistency in Floridi’s approach as evidenced by his writings.   
2. Mingers’ Theory of Information and Meaning 
Mingers had essentially the same concern as Floridi, namely to develop a theory of information 
that would cover its use both semantically and pragmatically. Mingers’ analysis began with a semi-
otic framework due to Morris (Morris, 1938) and Stamper (Stamper, 1991) that distinguishes four 
levels at which information can be considered – empirics (the transmission of signs and signals), 
syntactics (the formal properties of sign systems), semantics (the meaning of signs) and pragmat-
ics (the actual use of signs). The substantive theory was then developed drawing on the work of 
Dretske (1981), Maturana and Varela (1980) and Habermas (1979). It is cast within a critical realist 
(Bhaskar, 1978, 1979) framework (Mingers, 2004)2. 
                                                     
1
 Floridi’s papers have recently been consolidated into a book (Floridi, 2011). I will generally refer to the original papers 
unless there is something substantively different in the book 
2
 Floridi (2008a) also supports forms of realism that are very compatible with Bhaskar’s critical realism. 
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2.1. Analysis of Existing Theories of Information 
The first stage was an evaluation of existing theories of semantic information, at least up to the 
early 1990s when the work was carried out (Mingers, 1996b). At that time a major split could be 
discerned between those who viewed information as essentially objective, independent of the re-
ceiver, and those who viewed it as subjective, constructed by the receiver from the message or 
sign. The former approach was the standard in applied disciplines such as information systems 
where information was seen as data that had been processed in some way to make it useful (see 
Lewis (1991) for a survey). The more radical alternative, proposed by, for example, Checkland 
(1990, p. 303), was that information was “data plus meaning”.  That is, observers would receive 
some data and then apply their own set of meanings to it in order to produce information; different 
observers generating different information from the same data.  
 
Mingers specified four criteria with which to evaluate the theories: 
Generality – that the theory could cover as wide a range of usages of the term information as 
possible, in particular that it could account for semantic and pragmatic contexts. 
Relevance – in particular, that it be useful within the disciplines of information systems and in-
formation science. This had definitional aspects – that it define clearly the nature of information and 
distinguish it from related terms such as data and meaning; and behavioural aspects – that it re-
flected the observed behaviour of information users in real situations, and the interpretive nature of 
social reality. 
Integration – primarily across disciplines that all use the term information. 
Intuitiveness – if the other criteria are all met then it is better to have a conceptualisation that fits 
with our intuitive understanding  of information rather than one that does not. 
 
A wide range of theories were then examined, many of them developing from Shannon and 
Weaver’s original work on information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Three principal ap-
proaches identified were: 
 
Information as logical possibility. Bar-Hillel and Carnap (Bar-Hillel & Carnap, 1952, 1964) devel-
oped a system in which the information content of a message within a formal system was meas-
ured in terms of the number of other statement in the system that were incompatible with it or, con-
versely, the number of statement that actually implied it.  This has several major limitations: i) it is 
based on a purely formal system of possible statements and would be quite impractical in a real-
world situation. ii) It bases its probabilities on logical possibilities rather than actual occurrences 
and is better seen as working at the syntactic rather than semantic level. Iii) It does not deal at all 
with the possible interpretations that an observer or receiver may make of a signal or message; it 
only deals with linguistic propositions, excluding other forms of information. 
 
Information as reduction in uncertainty. Hintikka (1968), Nauta (1972) and Artandi (1973) all de-
veloped theories in which information was related to the reduction in uncertainty brought about by a 
message in a receiver. This changed the focus to bring in the receiver and their previous state of 
knowledge and their goals. Thus, if the receiver already knew the content of a message, or if the 
receiver did not understand the message, it contained no information (for them).  This approach 
was closer to the pragmatic dimension of information, but left the definition of information itself un-
clear, especially in relation to the difference between meaning and information. It also made infor-
mation essentially subjective – newspapers, timetables and books could not themselves contain 
information as that only came about when they were consulted.  
 
Information as a change in cognitive structure. Mackay (1956, 1969) also say information as 
relative to the receiver of a message. In particular, he identified it as the change in cognitive struc-
ture (interpreted as a set of readinesses or conditional probabilities) brought about or selected by a 
particular message. This makes it relative to the prior cognitive state. He also tied the concept ex-
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plicitly to that of “meaning”, recognising three forms – the meaning the sender intends, the meaning 
generated in the receiver, and the “conventional” meaning of the message. The “information con-
tent” of a message is then the size or extent of the change brought about in the receiver by the 
meaning they interpret. Some implications of this theory are: i) two different messages may gener-
ate the same meaning for someone, and thus the same information. ii) A message repeated cannot 
generate any information for the receiver even though it still has meaning. And, iii) a message may 
not generate any meaning (or information) if it does not have a selective function for the receiver, 
e.g., if it is in an unknown language. 
 
This theory was made more rigorous by Luhmann (1990), a German phenomenologist, and can 
be seen as a good model for Checkland’s information = data + meaning. However, it still makes 
information essentially subjective as in the previous approach. 
2.2. Theory of Semantic Information 
Mingers’ theory begins from the position that the foundation of information, data and more gen-
erally signs, must be differences in the physical world, as Bateson (1973) argued, for without differ-
ence there is only uniformity or the void (Spencer-Brown, 1972). More particularly, differences that 
“make a difference”, that is generate an event or a sign. Following Dretske (1981) it was argued 
that events carry information because the occurrence of an event reduces the possibilities of what 
might happen to what actually does happen, as Shannon and Weaver argued (Shannon & Weaver, 
1949). In particular, an event (which includes a signal or message) carries the information about 
what caused it, or led to it. That is, what must be the case in the world for the event to have oc-
curred?  Such information exists independently of any observer, indeed, it might never actually be 
observed. Nevertheless it carries with it the information concerning its own genesis. 
 
Information can also be transmitted provided that there are causal links between the sender (not 
necessarily a person) and the receiver. This occurs to the extent to which states of the sender are 
correlated or connected to states of the receiver. Independent events transmit no information; 
completely linked events transmit all information. Most situations are between the two extremes – 
the receiver can be affected by things other than the sender (noise), and not all of the information 
from the source will affect the receive (equivocation). An instrument is a good example – states of 
the environment, e.g., temperature, causally affect states of the thermometer and the thermometer 
thus carries information about the temperature. However, things other than the temperature such 
as magnetism could affect the thermometer, or there could be temperatures outside the range of 
the thermometer which cannot be registered 
 
Note also that, following Bhaskar (1993), absences can be causes and therefore can generate 
information. So the gas bill that is not paid by the due date generates information to that effect for 
the company, which then triggers a reminder letter.  
 
Information is, then, clearly defined – semantic informational is the propositional content of a 
sign, that is, what is implied about states of affairs in the world given that the sign exists. This defi-
nition has several consequences: 
 
 Information is an objective commodity – it is carried by events and signs whether or not it is 
observed or extracted, and information can be stored and transmitted by the environment, arte-
facts and people. 
 Information is distinct from its embodiment in a sign or message since the information itself can 
have causal events – a knock on the door leads us to open it not because of the physical 
knock, but because it carries the information that someone is there. Information itself is there-
fore not physical but the data that represents or carries it must at some point be physically em-
bodied. 
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 The amount of information that is available to a particular receiver depends on their prior state 
(often knowledge) relative to the sign. A book in Chinese has no available information for 
someone who does not read Chinese. Signs about a car not starting will have much more in-
formation available for a mechanic than someone who is only a driver. This does not contradict 
the idea that information is objective – if someone does not know the combination to a safe the 
money inside is not available to them but still exists. 
 A sign carries the information that a particular state of affairs exists, and also all the conse-
quences of that state of affairs that follow nomically, logically, or conventionally. 
 Information must be true. We may misunderstand or misinterpret a sign but the sign itself only 
carries true information. Consider this example – you are looking for a men’s toilet and see a 
picture of a man on a door. You go in and are embarrassed to find it is actually the women’s 
toilet. Does the sign carry information? It clearly does not carry the information that this is the 
men’s toilet, and thus misinformation is not information. It does, however, carry some infor-
mation, namely concerning why it came to be there. Was it a mistake by the builders, or a prac-
tical joke? As observers, we cannot tell because the sign is mute, but it, nevertheless, carries 
this information and not other, misinformation.  
2.3. Information and Meaning 
The previous section described a theory of semantic information based largely on Dretske. This 
section describes Mingers’ extensions to examine the relationship between information and mean-
ing. To start, it is useful to define some terms: 
 
 Signification. A sign is caused by an event and carries that information. When it is taken, by an 
observer, as a sign of the event then it is said to have “signification”. The sign signifies the 
causal event. This is essentially semantic information. 
 Import. Such a sign will have certain implications for the observer and may lead to some form 
of action. This is said to be the “import” of the sign for the particular observer. 
 Connotation. Signs are direct effects, e.g, a paw print in the ground. Symbols rely on some 
form of agreed conventions governing their use and meaning (syntax and semantics), e.g., that 
blue on a map represents water. This is a system of connotations. 
 Intent. Finally, in the case of deliberate utterances (which could be linguistic of symbolic), the 
sender will have some intention in creating the utterance. 
These terms allow us to define clearly ambiguous concepts such as data, information and 
meaning.  
 
 Data is a collection of signs, usually brought together for some purpose, to store or transmit 
information. They are usually numeric, pictorial or linguistic. 
 Semantic information is the propositional content of data, typically in the form of a message but 
also in the form of a naturally occurring sign. 
 Meaning has two different usages. First there is the system of meanings that are publically 
available within a sign system such as language. These can be drawn on by competent lan-
guage users in their communications (Habermas, 1979). It is that which allows an utterance to 
carry information but it is not identical to that information.  This is termed “connotation” above. 
The second usage is the “meaning” that the recipient gains from an utterance (“import”) and/or 
that which the sender intends (“intent”). Again, these are all different from the information itself 
(“signification”). 
To summarise, let us consider an example – the colour blue on a map which, according to the 
conventions, connotes that there is water at that place in the world. If there is indeed water there 
then the map also carries that information. If there actually is not, perhaps because of a printer’s 
error, then it does not carry that information. The reader of the map converts the information into 
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meaning (import) in a process that Dretske terms “digitalising the analogue” (Dretske, 1981). All 
signs are ultimately transmitted as a set of analogue differences (light, sound, heat etc) and these 
get converted into a specific digital distinction by the nervous system. The nervous system extracts 
from the information available a specific meaning relative to its own prior state, e.g., knowledge and 
intentions. 
 
Mingers (1995) suggests that this can be seen analytically as happening in three stages: under-
standing, which involves capturing the basic semantic information carried by the sign or utterance; 
connotation, at which stage other relevant knowledge that the receiver may have, and the further 
implications of the information, are brought together; and intent, at which stage the consequences 
for the receiver are fully realised leading perhaps to a reply, an action, or simply a memory. 
 
The second stage is particularly important in connection with Floridi’s theory. The knowledge 
that it brought into the interpretation of the information is not just individual but socially structured. 
That is, particular groups will have more or less knowledge, and therefore be able to extract more 
or less meaning, from a particular source of information, e.g., geographers from maps, and me-
chanics from cars. These different readinesses to be able to interpret information, or frames of 
meaning, can be likened to Wittgenstein’s forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1958). Note that the transfor-
mation of information into meaning is intentional, in a phenomenological sense – it requires a sen-
tient being. Computers can transmit information but cannot transform it into meaning. Conversely, 
human beings only process meaning, not information. 
 
2.4. Developments beyond Semantic Information 
 
In this section I would just like to mention three further developments in my theory of information 
which go beyond that discussed by Floridi. 
The first development is the extension from natural, environmental information to full linguistic 
utterances (Mingers, 1995). This draws on Habermas’s theory of communicative action (Habermas, 
1979; Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 1987). Put briefly, the information carried by non-linguistic 
signs (e.g., tree rings or knocks on the door) relates only to its origin, i.e, to what (generally physi-
cally) caused it. However, in full human communication there are several extra dimensions that 
need to be considered in questioning what led to a particular utterance being made. Habermas 
argues that an utterance implicitly makes four “validity claims”, that is basic assumptions that could 
potentially be challenged. These are, that the utterance is: comprehensible (i.e., well-formed in the 
language and therefore able to be understood); that it is true with regards to states of affairs in the 
material world; that it is right in terms of the norms of the social world; and that it is truthful or sin-
cere in terms of the speaker’s intentions.  
The second development is to give greater consideration to the neurophysiological and cogni-
tive processes that occur in the translation or transformation of information into meaning. Here, I 
(Mingers, 2001) have drawn on the work of phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty (1962; 1963) and 
biologists Maturana and Varela (Maturana and Varela, 1980; Maturana, 1978; Varela, 1991) and 
their concepts of autopoiesis and embodied cognition. The essence of this position is to deny the 
Cartesian split between mind and body, which has been so fundamental in disciplines such as arti-
ficial intelligence, computing, information and cognitivist psychology, in favour of one that recognis-
es the essentially embodied nature of human cognition whether at the level of perception, thought, 
behaviour or language.  
The third development is to consider in more detail the relationship between information and 
knowledge (Mingers, 2008). Within information systems it is common to talk of an information hier-
archy (Tuomi, 1999) from data to information to knowledge although the problem is always to dis-
tinguish clearly the differences between the terms and the relationships between them. The theo-
ries of information discussed here have largely concerned the relation between data and infor-
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mation, but Dretske saw that information could also generate knowledge. If knowledge is taken to 
be true, justified belief, as it commonly is, then information, which must be true to be information, 
both generates the belief and also provides the justification to believe it, and therefore generates 
knowledge for the receiver. Knowledge that “x” is in fact the case. The relationship between infor-
mation and knowledge has also been considered by Floridi (2004a, 2006, 2010b) but is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
3. Floridi’s Theory of Semantic Information 
3.1. Information as meaningful data 
Floridi begins with the recognition, following Weaver, that there are different levels at which we 
can consider the nature of information – the technical aspects concerned with the quantification of 
information and its transmission, which was dealt with by Shannon and Weaver; the semantic as-
pect which deals with the meaning of informational messages (and is Floridi’s main concern); and 
the “influential” aspect which concerns the effects of information on human behaviour. This typolo-
gy is very similar to the one I used, developed by Morris and Stamper, although it has only three 
levels. 
 
Floridi then asserts that the most common form of an account of information (especially in ap-
plied disciplines such as information systems (IS)) is the “bipartite” one in which information is said 
to be the result of “data + meaning”. That is, it consists of a collection of data that is in some sense 
“meaningful”. Floridi (2005, p. 353) does actually quote a paper of mine in support of this view 
(Mingers, 1997). Whilst it is true that I argued that the “data + meaning” account had become 
common (not the most common), it is not the case that I actually support it, as might be inferred 
from Floridi’s paper.  
 
In fact, at this point I believe Floridi conflates two different views of information – the objective 
and subjective ones that I discussed above. In his 2005 paper (Floridi, 2005), Floridi terms this 
general theory of information the DOS account, where DOS stands for Declarative, Objective, and 
Semantic (note the term objective). He then says “Over the last three decades most analyses have 
supported a definition of DOS information in terms of data + meaning” (p. 353) and gives thee quo-
tations to support this.  
“Information is data that has been processed into a form that is meaningful to the recipi-
ent” (Davis & Olson, 1985, p. 200) 
“Data is the raw material that is processed and refined to generate information” (Silver & 
Silver, 1989, p. 6) 
“Information equals data plus meaning” (P. Checkland & Scholes, 1990, p. 303) 
These three quotes do not, in fact, support the same conceptualisation – there is a major onto-
logical break between the first two and the third. The traditional view of information within IS is that 
it was data that had been processed in some way to make it more useful (or meaningful) but it re-
mained objective, essentially independent of the receiver. Checkland’s work on “soft systems” rep-
resented a major break away from an objective view of systems and information towards a subjec-
tive, interpretive, phenomenological one. (P Checkland & Holwell, 1998; P. J. Lewis, 1993). After a 
similar review of definitions in the existing IS literature, Checkland states: “The most important fea-
ture of this analysis of data, capta, information and knowledge is that the act of creating information 
is a human act, not one which a machine can accomplish. It is the human being who can attribute 
meaning to the selected data … in a context which may well be shared by many people but may 
also be unique to an individual” (P Checkland & Holwell, 1998, p. 91), and “Most of {the definitions} 
do not cover the clear possibility that different people may attribute different meanings to the same 
data” (P Checkland & Holwell, 1998, p. 95). Thus, for Checkland information is always tied to the 
tripleC 10(i): pp-pp, 2012 7 
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012. 
receiver(s) who attribute their meanings to the data. The implication is that computers cannot store 
or transmit information, and books cannot hold information. 
 
It is interesting that, in the 2009 paper, Floridi (2009b) changes terminology and characterises 
this bipartite theory as a “general definition of information” (GDI) rather than DOS. In both cases, 
he analyses it (basing this partly on Devlin’s theory (Devlin, 1991)) in terms of three conditions: 
σ is an instance of information, understood as semantic content, iff  
σ  consists of data; 
the data are well-formed syntactically (wfd); 
the wfd are meaningful. 
Thus, information consists of data; the data must conform to some syntactical rules; and the da-
ta must involve the “meanings” of the system or recipient. Note that Floridi explicitly accepts that 
data and information need not be linguistic but could be, for example, pictorial, again inherent in my 
(and Dretske’s) theory. 
 
In fleshing out the GDI theory, Floridi next explicates the nature of data, which is clearly funda-
mental to GDI (I do not think that it is the case that the various proponents of the bipartite approach 
(e.g., Checkland (1998)) would actually accept all of Floridi’s formulation, especially “genetic neu-
trality” as discussed below). Data rests ultimately on some kind of “difference”,  that is a lack of 
uniformity. Without a difference there can be no distinction as Bateson recognised (and Floridi ref-
erences). Floridi says that the difference may be simply discernable in the physical world (de re); it 
may be between (perceptions) of different physical states or quantities (de signo); or it may be be-
tween different symbols (de dicto). It is important to recognise that data can be decoupled from its 
physical manifestation (e.g., the number 2 could be represented by two stones or two lines), and 
the (semantic) information can be decoupled from a particular dataset (e.g., it could be displayed in 
a picture or writing). Again, this is very much the starting point for my formulation. 
 
Floridi then argues that this conceptualisation implies several degrees of neutrality or underde-
termination of the nature of data: 
 
 Taxonomic neutrality (TAXN): data is inherently a relational concept – it is a difference 
between two relata, but there is no precedence between the relata. 
 Typological neutrality (TN): there can be different types of data, e.g., primary data, sec-
ondary data, metadata, but whatever type, there can be no information without data. 
Note however that Floridi allows that an absence may itself be an item of data – the lack 
of payment of a bill, or answer to a question – may carry information. 
 Ontological neutrality (ON): data, and thus information, implies that there must be some 
form of representation, but it does not have to be a physical one. It could be infor-
mation-theoretic, i.e., taking information to be a fundamentally different category to ei-
ther matter or energy. At some point, however, there must be some form of physical 
manifestation or representation: "The dependence of information on the occurrence of 
syntactically well-formed data, and of data on the occurrence of differences variously 
implementable physically, explains why information can so easily be decoupled from its 
support. (Floridi, 2009b, p.18, my emphasis). 
 Genetic neutrality (GN): by this, Floridi means that the data can come to have a mean-
ing (and therefore be semantic information) independently of any informee (i.e., recipi-
ent). The example he gives is the Rosetta Stone which was seen as containing infor-
mation even before anyone could understand it.  
Now this, I believe, would be very controversial among those who put forward the bipartite view. 
Certainly Checkland (1990) would argue, as we saw above, that the whole point of the “data + 
meaning” formulation is to show that whereas data may be independent of the informee, infor-
mation is not. It is precisely the subjective meaning that the individual ascribes or attributes to the 
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data which generates information for them. For example, a clock may read “3.30” (data):  one ob-
server may generate the information “I am late for my meeting”, and another “it’s time for tea”. It 
also seems to be in contradiction to Floridi’s own ideas later on (Section 3.3) in terms of levels of 
abstraction (LoA). This marks a major dichotomy between seeing information as objective or sub-
jective.  
 
Floridi draws another distinction here, which is whether information can also be independent of 
a (human) producer. Some, e.g., Dretske (1981) and myself, would allow environmental infor-
mation such as tree rings, or animal prints provided that there was some sort of causal link which 
generated, and perhaps transmitted, the information. Note that Floridi maintains that environmental 
information may well be used, by animals and plants, but not be “meaningful” if it is not processed 
by human agents. Floridi also makes the point (Floridi, 2009b, p. 21) that the absence of data, as in 
the lack of answer to a question, may itself generate information, again a similarity with Mingers. 
 
What is Floridi’s own evaluation of GDI (or DOS)? In Floridi (2005) he argues that the DOS def-
inition provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for data to become information, and that 
what is additionally needed is the stipulation that the data is also truthful, as will be shown below.  
3.2. The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
Having developed the GDI as a background to other information theories, Floridi next explains 
Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) mathematical theory of communication. This is generally accepted 
as the most rigorous and well-developed analysis of some properties of information, or at least 
signal transmission, but is clearly not applicable at the level of semantics or meaning. It is better 
seen as a theory of data transmission and has nothing to say about the actual content of a mes-
sage. However, he then points out that the fundamental ideas have been used as the basis for 
several well-known theories of semantic information including Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1952), Mac-
kay (1969), and Nauta (1972), all of whom were reviewed in my paper. 
3.3. Factual Information 
Floridi now develops his own view on information and, in particular, the necessary relationship 
with truth and then with knowledge. For Floridi, information is the true semantic content of data. 
Again, this is just what I (and Dretske) argued and makes the theory different from most other in-
formation theories. There are three important steps in his argument. 
 
First, data describe states of affairs in the world and may be true or false. Such data generates 
affordances or constraints for the agent who receives (and understands) it. For example, if the car 
stops and the petrol gauge reads empty this data makes it more likely that the agent comes to be-
lieve the car has run out of petrol (affordance) and less likely they will think the battery is flat (con-
straint). At this point we reach a significant step in the theory – Floridi says that it is the agent or 
observer who “constructs the information” from the data (Floridi, 2009b, p. 36). This is significant 
for the ontology of information for essentially it makes it subjective rather than objective. It is data 
that exists outside of the observer or receiver, but the information only comes into existence with 
the processing or interpretation of the data by a person (or perhaps other sentient being). This 
would seem to place Floridi in the same camp as Checkland and those who argue that information 
is data + meaning. 
 
The second step is the process by which data is transformed into meaning. Here, Floridi brings 
in a concept that he calls “levels of abstraction” (LoA) (Floridi, 2008b). This is essentially an inter-
face between the data and the receiver. It is epistemological rather than ontological. A specific LoA 
specifies the type of data that can be processed by a receiver if that data is available. In more usu-
al terms it could be said to be the specific set of relevant constructs or system of meanings that is 
available to the particular observer. Floridi recognises that this may not be purely individual – dif-
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ferent types of people – e.g., drivers, engineers or economists – may bring with them different LoAs 
to a particular set of data, e.g., that car not working, and thereby construct or generate different 
information from the same data. 
 
This idea is very similar to my analysis of the way that information is transformed into meaning, 
namely that the information available to a particular receiver will depend on the personal 
knowledge that the receiver has, and also the knowledge they have by virtue of being a particular 
type of person. 
 
The third step is to consider the question of the truthfulness of information. For some theorists, 
such as Devlin (1991), Colburn (2000) and Fetzer (2004), meaningful, well-formed data constitutes 
information whether or not it is actually true. However, Floridi sides with those such as Dretske 
(1981) and Grice (1989) who argue that false information, misinformation or disinformation is not 
actually information at all. I will not repeat the debate here as my theory accepts it as well but see 
Floridi (2004b, 2005) for the detail.   
3.4. Quantifying Semantic Information 
Finally, Floridi considers the question of whether semantic information can be quantified (Floridi, 
2004b). There have been several approaches to this problem. For example, the mathematical theo-
ry of communication which, as we have seen, does not apply to semantic information; and Bar-
Hillel and Carnap (1952) who base their method on Shannon and Weaver but calculate the amount 
of information that a message or statement carries in terms of the number of possibilities it logically 
excludes within the set of all possible messages in a pre-defined system of terms. 
 
My own view is that it is inappropriate to try and quantify information at the semantic or prag-
matic levels. The principal argument is very simple – proper quantification (of the sort implied by 
Floridi’s (2009b) Figure 5 ) requires that the constructs to be quantified can be measured on an 
interval scale of measurement but much semantic content, especially of a linguistic kind, can only 
be measured on nominal or ordinal scales. One can understand, and perhaps compare, meanings 
but one cannot generally measure them, or measure their degree of divergence from one another.  
4. Comparison and Evaluation – Is Information Objective? 
I believe that I have demonstrated a significant number of similarities in the two theories. From 
their origins in difference and distinction and their rejection of theories based on the mathematical 
theory of communication, through to the idea of semantic information being data that represents 
true states of affairs in the world, and the similarity between Floridi’s levels of abstraction (LoA) and 
my frames of meaning. As I said in the introduction, the point of this is simply to establish the extent 
to which Floridi’s theory was prefigured by my own in order to set the record straight. 
 
However, there also appears to be a significant difference in the endpoint, perhaps generated 
by potential contradictions in Floridi’s approach. The issue concerns the exact ontological status of 
information – is it objective, existing independently of any receiver or (in the case of environmental 
information) producer, as Dretske and myself would argue? Or, is it subjective, constructed anew 
by the receiver when they interact with data, as Checkland would hold? This is clearly a fundamen-
tal question for any theory of information. To be clear, we can label three different positions: 
 
OBJ1: The received view within information systems is that information is objective as it is just 
data that has been processed in some way. It is then transferred unproblematically into the 
cognition of observers. 
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SUBJ: Here, following Checkland, MacKay and Luhmann, information is some change in state 
of the cognitive apparatus of an observer. It is therefore intrinsically subjective. Data is inter-
preted through the observer’s system of meaning to generate information for the observer. 
 
OBJ2: Dretske and Mingers argue that data carries information which is therefore objective, po-
tentially able to be accessed by observers. This generates meaning, and potentially knowledge, 
for the observer through a process of embodied cognition. 
 
Now, the question is where does Floridi’s conception of semantic information stand with respect 
to these three possibilities? The answer, it seems to me, is somewhat equivocal in his various writ-
ings. It is quite possible to make out a case, especially from the earlier writings, that semantic in-
formation is objective, independent of the observer. But it is also possible to see passages which 
suggest that information is indeed, at least in part, dependent on the observer or receiver, and 
therefore not wholly objective in the sense of OBJ2. We will develop these two competing view-
points. 
 
In the 2005 paper, as we have seen, Floridi accepts the DOS view of information, including its 
claim to objectivity, arguing only that it needs to be extended to include the stipulation that infor-
mation must be true to be information. However, by 2009 the theory is called GDI (General Defini-
tion of Information), perhaps significantly excluding the connotation of objectivity. Nevertheless, the 
criterion of genetic neutrality (GeN) states that data can have a semantics (i.e., it can be meaning-
ful) independently of an informee. Whilst this is not quite the same as saying that the actual infor-
mation is independent, Floridi does go on to say: 
 
“GeN supports the possibility of information without an informed subject … Meaning is 
not (at least not only) in the mind of the user. GeN is to be distinguished from the 
stronger, realist thesis, supported by Dretske (1981), according to which data could also 
have their own semantics independently of an intelligent produced/informer” (p. 23) 
This latter point is the slightly different one, namely can information be produced unintentional-
ly? For example, does a paw print in the jungle carry information about the presence of an animal – 
is it data that is well-formed and meaningful? Dretske (and myself) would say yes; Floridi is not 
sure that such data can in fact be meaningful. 
 
In Floridi (2009a), semantic information is redefined as “p qualifies as semantic information if 
and only if p is (constituted by) well-formed, meaningful and veridical data” (p. 143). Then it is stat-
ed that “a large variety of kinds of semantic information, from traffic lights to train timetables, from 
road signs to fire alarms, falls within the scope {of this definition}” (p. 146). It may seem rather 
strange to categorise a physical object such as a traffic light, in itself, as an instance of well-formed, 
veridical data (rather than, say, simply a generator of such data), a point we will return to later in 
the paper. But, for our purposes it does at least show that Floridi appears happy with the idea that 
there are examples of semantic information that are external to and independent of an observer, 
and thus corresponding to OBJ2. 
 
Going further, Floridi (2008a) has developed a metaphysics based around the idea of informa-
tional objects (the “infosphere”) that he calls “informational structural realism” (ISR). He summaris-
es this as follows:  
 
“As a form of realism, ISR is committed to the existence of a mind-independent reality 
addressed by and constraining our knowledge. … A significant consequence of ISR is 
that, as far as we can tell, the ultimate nature of reality is informational, that is it makes 
sense to adopt LoA s that commit out theories to a view of reality as mind-independent 
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and constituted by structural objects that are neither substantial nor material but infor-
mational.” (p. 240) 
And,  
“A straightforward way of making sense of these structural objects is as informational 
objects, that is cohering clusters of data, not in the alphanumeric sense of the word, but 
in an equally common sense of differences de re, i.e., mind-independent, concrete 
points of lack of uniformity” (p. 236) 
So, all of the above seems to suggest that Floridi has a strong sense of information being objec-
tive, both epistemologically and ontologically.  
 
However, in places things seem less clear. We read that: 
 
 “The data that constitute factual information allow or invite certain constructs (they are 
affordances for the information agent that (sic) can take advantage of them) and resist 
or impede some others (they are constraints for the same agent) depending on the in-
teraction with, and the nature of, the information agent that processes them. For exam-
ple, the red light flashing repetitively and the engine not starting allow you (or any other 
information agent like you) to construct the information … This is the sense in which da-
ta are constraining affordances for (an information agent responsible for) the elaboration 
of factual information” (Floridi, 2009b, p. 36 orig. emphasis) 
 
“{LoAs} are interfaces that mediate the epistemic relation between the observed and the 
observer. … Data … are translated into factual information by being processed seman-
tically at a given LoA” (Floridi, 2009b, p. 37) 
 
The picture that seems to emerge from these quotes is very much the subjectivist one in which 
objective (i.e., external) data is processed by a receiver applying their meaning system (LoA) to it in 
such a way as to generate or construct information. Factual information only comes into existence 
when data has been processed by an “information agent”. In fact, Floridi labels his approach as 
“constructionist” (as opposed to “constructivist”): 
 
“From this perspective, the world is neither discovered nor invented but designed by the epis-
temic agents experiencing it. This is neither a realist nor an anti-realist but a constructionist view of 
information” (Floridi, 2011, p. 78) 
 
There does seem to me to be a distinct difference between the two position on information out-
lined above. In the first, semantic information is identified with data, albeit only a special type of 
data (well-formed, meaningful, true), it actually is nothing but the data. In the second case, infor-
mation appears to be different to but derivable from data with suitable processing by an agent. In 
the first case, information is objective, in the second it is at least partly subjective, driven both by 
the affordances/constraints of the data, and the knowledge and purposes of the agent. Apart from 
the fact that this is a substantive inconsistency within Floridi’s overall theory, I would argue that in 
fact both positions are problematic.  
 
Consider the following examples with regard to the first position: 
 
Ex1:  “gsyn tthh5 kounf  gttre” 





12 Author First Name Last Name 
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012. 
Ex1 is data but cannot be information because it is not well-formed or meaningful. Ex2 is well-
formed and meaningful but is only information if it is in fact true that the day on which I am writing 
this is in fact Thursday 11
th
 (which it is). Ex3 is well-formed and meaningful but I do not think that it 
can be either true or false, it is simply an exclamation. In order to be true, something must bear 
some relationship to something else against which its truth or falsity can be assessed. These ex-
amples show that it is problematic to identify information purely with data, even of a special type. It 
is much better to say that information is “carried by” or “represented in” data but is separate to it. 
This allows for the proper degrees of neutrality of information from its particular representation. In 
Dretske and my versions, information is “the propositional content of a sign”, it is not the sign itself.  
 
In terms of the second position, it leads to a confusion between meaning and information. When 
the observer reacts to some data it generates a cognitive change in them. Is this change meaning 
or information? Either the two are in fact referring to the same thing in which case one is redun-
dant; or they are different but then what exactly is the difference?  
 
From my perspective, data, both linguistic and natural, carry information about states of affairs 
in the world. This is objective and independent and exists whether or not anyone actually interacts 
with it. Receivers then process this information, given the existing state of their nervous system, in 
such a way as to produce meaning (import) for them. Thus, information is objective and meaning is 
subjective. This makes it perfectly reasonable to say that machines and artefacts can store and 
perhaps transmit information while people generate individual interpretations of it. This also fits 
better with the stipulation that information must be true. When a receiver, through a LoA, processes 
data into information they may always be mistaken in which case the result would not actually be 
information. There is no such problem with meaning, for meaning does not have to be true. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has made two contributions. First, that Floridi’s theory of information was largely pre-
figured by that of Mingers, which itself was a synthesis of a range of theorists including Dretske, 
Maturana and Varela, Bhaskar and Habermas. The point of this is simply to set the record straight 
in terms of the origin of theoretical ideas. To the extent that the two theories are similar, then this 
provides some corroboration of the underlying ideas. 
 
Second, that there appears to be a degree of equivocation, if not actual inconsistency, about the 
ontological status of information within Floridi’s theory. In earlier papers he seemed to support a 
DOS view of information which made it clearly objective, independent of the receiver of a message. 
However, in  later papers it appears that information is generated or constructed by the receiver 
upon receipt of data, which would make it subjective. Obviously this is a vital question that needs to 
be answered in as clear a manner as possible. Mingers (and Dretske) both support the view that 
information is objective. 
 
Looking to the future, “information” is obviously a fundamental, transdisciplinary concept, and it 
is somewhat of a scandal that there is not yet an agreed and accepted definition. It would be a 
major advance if such a concept could emerge, and Floridi’s work in developing both a philosophy 
of information and theory of information is playing a major role in this. It must be acknowledged that 
he has developed his own ideas in a major way towards the concept of the “infosphere” which en-
visages reality as consisting of informational structures or objects that have their own intrinsic 
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